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NOTE

You Have the Right to Remain Thirteen:
Considering Age in Juvenile Interrogations in
J.D.B. v. North Carolina
NICOLE J. ETTLINGER†
INTRODUCTION
Few reasonable adults would argue that a thirteenyear-old child is as suitable as an adult to join the military,
marry, vote, or receive other privileges and responsibilities
reserved for adulthood.1 The difference in the rights or
privileges granted to adults as compared with children is
often explained and justified by citing to children‟s lesser
level of maturity, their psychological and emotional
development, or the mere “reality”2 that children are not
“miniature adults.”3
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2012, SUNY Buffalo Law School. Thank you to: my
family, for always being proud, especially my grandmother, “Ma,” for teaching
me to love reading and writing from the start; M.A.E., for your encouragement;
and everyone at the Buffalo Law Review, for your hard work.
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 569 (2005) (“[T]he reasons why
juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also
explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that
of an adult.” (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988))).
2. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011); see also id. at 2413
(Alito, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 2397 (majority opinion); see Roper, 543 U.S at 569 (“[A] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”
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One substantial difference between adults and children
is how they experience and understand the significance and
resulting consequences of police interrogations.4 In
recognition of this difference, several state statutes
currently acknowledge children‟s differing legal status and
increased vulnerability to coercion by providing heightened
protections to juveniles in police interrogations.5 Despite
these recognized differences in American society, culture,
and the legal system, until recently in interrogations with
law enforcement, children and adults were viewed through
the same lens—that of the reasonable person.6
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme
Court, in a divided decision, held that age is an objective
factor a court may consider when determining whether an
individual subjected to police interrogation was in custody
for purposes of issuing Miranda warnings.7 In this
(quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Brief of Juvenile Law Center, et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 11, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No.
09-11121) [hereinafter Brief of Juvenile Law Center, et al.] (“Psychosocial
factors influence adolescents‟ perceptions, judgment and decision-making and
limit their capacity for autonomous choice.” (citing Elizabeth Cauffman &
Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents‟ Judgment and Culpability, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL : A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON J UVENILE J USTICE 325
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000))); Kathryn Lynn Modecki,
Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and
Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 78, 79-80 (2008).
4. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962) (finding a fourteenyear-old‟s age relevant in how he perceived interrogation from law enforcement);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (recognizing that a child may not be able
to withstand a police interrogation‟s pressures in the way an adult would);
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles‟ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 41-48 (2006); see also supra
note 3.
5. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 3204 (2003) (prohibiting the
admissibility of statements of juvenile or juvenile‟s family made in preliminary
investigation or during assessment of juvenile for a juvenile drug treatment
program); MO. REV. STAT § 211.131 (2000) (requiring that parents of juveniles
taken into custody be notified as soon as possible); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101
(2007) (expanding Miranda rights for juveniles during custodial interrogations).
6. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667-68 (2004) (holding that the
lower court did not err by failing to consider the minor defendant‟s age in its
custody analysis).
7. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402-03.
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surprising holding,8 the Court found that children are
undeniably different from adults and will often feel
compelled to speak where an adult would not—a decision
which will reverberate in the courtrooms, police stations,
schoolhouses, and state legislatures in both the immediate
and distant future.
In In re J.D.B., the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the age of the respondent, a thirteen-year-old, should
not be considered in determining whether the child was in
custody when interrogated by police at his middle school.9
Based on the circumstances of the interrogation, excluding
the child‟s age, the court concluded he was not in custody,
and therefore Miranda warnings were properly withheld,10
as police must give Miranda warnings only when one is in
police custody.11
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari12
to resolve the question that J.D.B. argued should be
answered in the affirmative: “[W]hether the Miranda
custody analysis includes consideration of a juvenile‟s age.”13
This Note examines the consideration of age in juvenile
interrogations by law enforcement. It supports the United
States Supreme Court‟s determination that age is an
objective factor relevant in the Miranda custody inquiry and
suggests that it is still essential for states to implement
additional protections for juveniles in law enforcement
interrogations. Part I will provide a brief background of
Miranda and its progeny. It will lay out the procedural
history leading to the United States Supreme Court grant of
certiorari on the issue of whether age is an objective factor
to be considered in custodial interrogations. Part II
discusses the facts surrounding J.D.B.‟s case and the North
Carolina Supreme Court‟s holding and rationale. Next, Part
III analyzes the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in
8. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Today‟s 5 New Supreme Court Opinions,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 16, 2011, 10:55 AM), http://www.concurring
opinions.com/archives/2011/06/todays-5-new-supreme-court-opinions.html.
9. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 140 (N.C. 2009), rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
10. Id.
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
12. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (granting certiorari).
13. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011).
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J.D.B. v. North Carolina, considering the impact of this
holding on the states thus far and in the future. Part III
also will discuss reasons why the North Carolina state
courts, on remand, should find J.D.B. in custody. In doing
so, it will analyze the factors considered by the North
Carolina Supreme Court and what now may be considered
in the Miranda custody analysis following the United States
Supreme Court‟s decision to include age in the analysis.
In light of the uncertainty likely to come from the
United States Supreme Court‟s decision to consider age and
the need for additional safeguards for juveniles in addition
to Miranda protections, Part IV of this Note sets forth a
proposal providing for additional protections for juveniles
subjected to police interrogation. The proposal mandates the
presence of a parent or guardian when a juvenile under
sixteen years of age is questioned by law enforcement
regarding his involvement in the incident—regardless of
whether the child would be considered “in custody.”
I. THE MIRANDA CUSTODY ANALYSIS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
ensures that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”14 Miranda v. Arizona
safeguarded this right in setting forth the now ubiquitous
Miranda warnings.15 The warnings are a procedural
safeguard,16 protecting the Fifth Amendment right17 from
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed.”). The Court went on to explain,
however, that “Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards
for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective . . . in informing accused
persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to
exercise it.” Id. at 490.
16. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (“Miranda
requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain
silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be
honored.”). In response to claims that Miranda is simply a “prophylactic” rule
that could be overruled by an act of Congress, see, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 309 (1985), the Court in Dickerson held that Congress could not reject
Miranda through a congressional act. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. The Court‟s
holding in Dickerson expressed that Miranda had “constitutional
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the “inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual‟s will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”18
Miranda rights were extended to juveniles a year after
Miranda in In re Gault.19
The Miranda decision made clear that reading of
Miranda rights is only required when an interrogation by a
state agent is “custodial,” defined as where “a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.”20 Both the United
States Supreme Court and various lower courts have found
underpinnings” that could not be overruled by Congress, suggesting that
Miranda had “announced a constitutional rule.” Id. at 440 n.5, 444. However,
not long after Dickerson, in Chavez v. Martinez, the Court held that the failure
to give Miranda warnings during a custodial interrogation is not a
constitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment where the non-Mirandized
statements are not used against the suspect in court. 538 U.S. 760, 764, 767
(2003). The opinion again refers to Miranda as a prophylactic rule, perhaps
weakening the argument that Miranda is a constitutional rule. See id. at 772;
JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
490 (4th ed. 2006). But see Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing
Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 62-63
& n.105 (2006) (“[A]nalysis of Miranda claims cannot be so easily reduced to the
quasi-constitutional or sub-constitutional status they previously received.”).
Holland suggests that despite the cases that followed it, Dickerson‟s holding
made it so claims of Miranda as simply a prophylactic rule are, at least
somewhat, without teeth. Id.
17. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435. The Court in Dickerson concluded that the
Miranda rights are a constitutional rule. Id. at 444.
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault held that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,” noting that juveniles, along with
adults, have: the right of notice of charges against him, the right to
representation by counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right
to confront witnesses against him. Id. at 13, 33-34, 41, 55, 57. In extending
these rights to juveniles, Gault provided for the application of these rights in an
identical fashion as to adults, rather than providing guidelines as to how these
new rights should be used for juveniles. See Hillary B. Farber & Donna M.
Bishop, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Development Capacities
with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault 136 (Northeastern Pub. Law &
Theory Faculty Working Paper Series, Paper No. 28-2009, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306593 (“The Court erred in failing to recognize that
procedures that succeed in securing fairness for adults may not be sufficient to
secure fairness for children.”).
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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that the location of the interrogation, while relevant, is not
necessarily dispositive for whether a suspect was in custody
while interrogated.21 One may be in custody whether he is
interrogated in a police station interrogation room,22 his
bedroom,23 a car,24 a school,25 or elsewhere. The test for
determining custody for Miranda purposes has evolved over
time,26 but the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
expressed that the test is an objective,27 reasonable person
standard.28

21. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122, 1125 (1983) (questioning
in a police station interrogation house was not found to be custodial where the
interrogated appeared in the station voluntarily); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324,
325-27 (1969) (holding Orozco was in custody when he was questioned in his
bedroom by multiple officers).
22. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Though the Court
found that Mathiason was not in custody despite being questioned in a police
station, it acknowledged the assumption that when someone is in a similar
situation, he is usually in custody: “[T]he requirement of warnings [is not] to be
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or
because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Id.
23. See Orozco, 394 U.S. at 327.
24. See United States v. Scharf, 608 F.2d 323, 325 (9th Cir. 1978); People v.
Rifkin, 733 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (App. Div. 2001).
25. See Husband v. Turner, No. 07-CV-391-bbc, 2008 WL 2002737, at *3
(W.D. Wis. 2008) (finding that minor who was questioned by police at school was
in custody because he was escorted to a closed room by security and never told
he was free to leave or to refrain from answering questions).
26. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (holding that an individual is in custody for
Miranda purposes when his freedom of movement or freedom to leave the place
of interrogation is restricted in any significant way); Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125
(“[F]or purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a „formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement‟ of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.” (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495));
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“[T]he only relevant inquiry is
how a reasonable man in the suspect‟s position would have understood his
situation.”); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (“[A] court must
examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation . . . .”);
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (“Two discrete inquiries are
essential to the determination [of whether a person is in custody]: first, what
were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty
to terminate the interrogation and leave.”).
27. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323 (“[T]he initial determination of custody
depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
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Applying the Supreme Court‟s custody test has not been
a straightforward task for the courts.29 The Court had never
fully abandoned its older iterations of the test30 nor
explicitly explained how to weigh the different factors
surrounding the interrogation. Thompson v. Keohane, which
contains the Supreme Court‟s most recent recitation of the
custody rule prior to J.D.B., set forth a clearer rule for lower
courts to follow:
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the [custody]
determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a
reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and
31
the players‟ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must
apply an objective test to resolve “the ultimate inquiry”: “[was]
there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
32
degree associated with a formal arrest.

The test is a totality of the circumstances analysis: “[I]f
encountered by a „reasonable person,‟ would the identified

subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person
being questioned.”).
28. Id. at 325.
29. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 441 (“[T]he police and lower courts will continue
occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken
into custody.”); see DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL ., 1 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES §
4:29 (3d ed. 2008) (“The various decisions of the Supreme Court on this issue do
not provide a simple definition of „custody.‟”); see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS,
supra note 16, at 491 (“Ironically, therefore, although Miranda was intended to
serve as a bright-line alternative to the totality-of-the-circumstances
voluntariness standard, there is no bright line (formal arrests aside) for
determining whether „custody‟ exists and, therefore, whether Miranda
applies.”).
30. 23 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 713 (1980) (database updated July 2010).
While Supreme Court cases after Miranda “have severely limited the concept of
custody, they have not established a clear test of when custody exists and when
it does not. The tests developed by the lower courts are therefore still applicable
within their respective jurisdictions.” Id.
31. One author has interpreted the Court‟s language here to mean the
majority was “direct[ing] judges to contextualize the facts of the interrogation as
fully and richly as possible . . . .” Holland, supra note 16, at 47.
32. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (quoting California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda?”33
Though the court is to consider all of the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, “the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a „formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement‟ of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.”34 Thus, while this test considers the state of mind of
the suspect, the “question is not whether a reasonable
person would believe he was not free to leave, but rather
whether such a person would believe he was in police
custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.”35
Though this is totality of the circumstances analysis, the
high Court has never explicitly stated which specific
factors36 are “objective” and to be considered. United States
Supreme Court and state court decisions have resulted in a
list of factors considered relevant in the custody
determination. Objective considerations have included: the
length of the interrogation,37 whether police escorted the
subject to the interrogation,38 whether the subject was
placed in handcuffs,39 whether the subject was told he was
free to leave,40 whether the door of the interrogation room
33. Id. at 113.
34. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
495 (1977)).
35. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 374 (5th ed. 2009).
36. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct.
2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121). The petitioner‟s reply brief to the United States
Supreme Court expresses this sentiment further: “Beyond informing a suspect
that he is under arrest, no „bright line‟ exists in custody determinations and
never has.” Id.
37. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 909 N.Y.S.2d 820, 822 (App. Div. 2010). In
noting that the court may look at various factors in making the custody inquiry,
it cited as relevant the length of the interview, the cooperation of the suspect,
the restriction on movement, and the location of questioning. Id.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez-Argueta, No. 1:09cr544, 2010 WL
545933, at *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2010).
39. See, e.g., Vergara v. State, 657 S.E.2d 863, 867 (Ga. 2008). The Georgia
Supreme Court noted that whether the subject of the interrogation was placed
in handcuffs was a relevant factor in determining if he were under the
functional equivalent of arrest. Id.
40. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 760 N.W.2d 35, 44, 56 (Neb. 2009). The
Nebraska Supreme Court discussed several relevant factors in the custody
determination, including whether the subject of the interrogation were informed
he could decline questioning and leave. Id. at 53-54.
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was locked,41 whether the subject was permitted to leave the
interrogation at its completion,42 the pressure used to detain
the subject,43 and “the extent to which the defendant is
confronted with evidence of guilt.”44 Prior to J.D.B., the
United States Supreme Court had never explicitly stated
whether the age of the subject of the interrogation could be
considered in the custody determination.45 Yarborough v.
Alvarado46 was the only post-Miranda United States
Supreme Court decision to discuss whether age has a role in
determining whether a suspect was in “custody,” requiring
advisement of Miranda rights.47 The divided Court in
Alvarado held that a court does not have to take age into
account when determining that a suspect is in custody; yet,
the Court did not determine if age may be considered.48
41. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 492 (Minn. 2010).
42. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
43. See, e.g., id.
44. United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2002).
45. Yarborough v. Alvarado discussed age in the Miranda custody context,
but did not provide a determinative answer. 541 U.S. 652, 666-68 (2004); see
also In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 150 (N.C. 2009) (Hudson, J., dissenting)
(“Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has held squarely
that age can never be relevant to the custody inquiry.”), rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
46. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
47. Id. at 666-68. The Supreme Court has considered age in other Miranda
inquiries. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (holding age is a
factor to consider amongst the totality of the circumstances when ascertaining if
a Miranda waiver was voluntary). In Michael C., the suspect was a sixteen and
a half-year-old male who requested presence of his probation officer at his
interrogation and was denied. Id. at 710-11. Before Miranda was decided, the
Supreme Court recognized additional protections for juveniles subject to police
interrogations. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948). In Haley, the Court held
that a child cannot be held to the same standards as an adult in interrogations
because a fifteen-year-old defendant “cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.” Id.
48. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666-68; id. at 669 (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (“There
may be cases in which a suspect‟s age will be relevant to the „custody‟ inquiry
under Miranda . . . .”). In Alvarado, a seventeen and a half-year-old murder
suspect was brought to the station by his parents upon the request of the police,
denied the right to have his parents sit in on the interrogation, never read his
rights or told he was free to leave during the two hour interrogation, but
permitted to leave with his parents after confessing. Id. at 656, 658, 665.
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While the Court noted that age could be a “subjective
inquiry,”49 it also never reached a workable rule or standard
for how such a consideration may be made.50
Opponents to the consideration of age have mentioned
that age need not be considered in the custody analysis, as
one‟s age is already a permissible consideration when
determining whether a confession was knowingly,
intelligently, and freely given.51 Though this distinct
voluntariness test was not a direct concern in J.D.B.‟s case,
it had influence in the United States Supreme Court‟s
decision.52 The voluntariness test is an analysis separate
from that of the custody analysis that looks at the
evidentiary admissibility of incriminating statements
uttered during a suspect‟s custodial interrogation in order to
determine whether they were spoken voluntarily or whether
they were coerced.53 The voluntariness test54 was intended to
prevent the government from compelling an individual to

49. Id. at 668.
50. Alvarado came before the high Court on a writ of habeas corpus,
requiring great deference to the state court‟s findings. Id. at 655, 659-60 (citing
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C § 2254 (2006)). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the issue is whether the state court reasonably
applied “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In deciding the
“clearly established” law, the Court needed to determine only whether the state
court correctly used established precedent and law when it decided not to
consider the juvenile‟s age in the custody determination. See Alvarado, 541 U.S.
at 660-61; United States v. Little, 851 A.2d 1280, 1286 (D.C. 2004) (“Alvarado
did not strictly decide whether an accused‟s juvenile status is irrelevant to the
Miranda custody determination. That was unnecessary for its decision.”).
51. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973).
52. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011).
53. The voluntariness test is “an inquiry that examines „whether a
defendant‟s will was overborne‟ by the circumstances surrounding the giving of
a confession. The due process test takes into consideration „the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.‟” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434
(2000) (quoting Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226).
54. The voluntariness test was first acknowledged in Bram v. United States,
which held that coerced confessions are not admissible evidence. 168 U.S. 532,
564-65 (1897).
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self-incriminate.55 Miranda was decided, in part, because it
was felt that the voluntariness test alone did not sufficiently
protect an individual‟s rights.56
The voluntariness test is a totality of the circumstances
analysis,57 arising out of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right against selfincrimination in the Fifth Amendment.58 The voluntariness
test allows for consideration of personalized characteristics
of the individual subject to the potentially coercive
interrogation.59 Relevant consideration in the voluntariness
test‟s totality of the circumstances analysis have included
age, education level, length of detention, the nature of the
questioning, and whether the subject was informed of his
constitutional rights.60
II. IN RE J.D.B.: THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT
DECISION
In In re J.D.B.61 the North Carolina Supreme Court took
a significant step backward for children‟s rights by holding
that age is not a factor to be considered in determining if a

55. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936); see U.S. CONST. amend.
V. The voluntariness test is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
56. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (“Unless adequate
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the
product of his free choice.”); see also J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (“Miranda‟s
procedural safeguards exist precisely because the voluntariness test is an
inadequate barrier when custodial interrogation is at stake.”). But see Miranda,
384 U.S. at 512 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The Fifth Amendment, however, has
never been thought to forbid all pressure to incriminate one‟s self in the
situations covered by it.”).
57. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963).
58. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
59. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
60. Id.
61. 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009).
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person subject to police interrogation is “in custody,” thus
requiring Miranda rights.62
A. Background of In re J.D.B.: The Facts and Procedural
History
Thirteen-year-old special education student J.D.B. was
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent after being found guilty of
larceny and breaking and entering neighborhood homes. 63
The police officer assigned to the case, Detective
DiCostanzo, came to J.D.B.‟s middle school to speak with
him.64 Although DiCostanzo considered J.D.B. a suspect,65
neither he, nor the school, contacted J.D.B.‟s guardian,66
though a North Carolina statute permits juveniles to have a
parent
or
guardian
present
during
custodial
interrogations.67 In fact, the statute also requires that for
children under fourteen years of age, as J.D.B. was, a
parent or guardian must be present during an in-custody
admission or the admission will be suppressed.68
A “uniformed, armed police officer”69 assigned to the
school70 escorted J.D.B. from his seventh-grade classroom
62. Id. at 140. The United States Supreme Court, however, found otherwise—
that age is an objective consideration in the custody analysis. J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011).
63. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d. at 136.
64. Id.
65. See id. However, the author is not suggesting that the detective‟s belief
that J.D.B. was a suspect added to the custody determination, as this was not
initially articulated to J.D.B. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984) (supporting the position that when an officer has formed the intent to
arrest a suspect prior to his interrogation, this does not weigh on the custody
determination if the suspect is not aware of the officer‟s intentions).
66. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT . § 7B-2101 (2007). Because of this statute, it appears
that it would have crossed the officer‟s mind that such an interrogation may be
deemed custodial and that a parent should be contacted due to J.D.B.‟s very
young age.
68. Id.
69. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 143 (Brady, J., dissenting).
70. “A school resource officer („SRO‟) is a certified law enforcement officer who
is permanently assigned to . . . a school or a set of schools.” Holland, supra note
16, at 74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and informed J.D.B. that law enforcement had requested to
speak with him.71 J.D.B. soon found himself in a closed room
with four adults: the assistant principal, an administrative
intern, the School Resource Officer, and Detective
DiCostanzo.72 DiConstanzo directed J.D.B. to his interview
with police on the day of the break-in73 and asked J.D.B. if
he would discuss it.74 J.D.B. agreed to discuss this initial
police encounter.75 At this point, J.D.B. was not told that he
was allowed to leave the office, that he could refuse to
speak, or that he could contact his guardian.76 DiCostanzo
questioned J.D.B. about his involvement with crimes in the
neighborhood and confronted J.D.B. with conflicting
information.77 When the child denied involvement, the
detective confronted him with the stolen item itself.78 The
assistant principal urged J.D.B. to “do the right thing”79 and
told him “the truth always comes out in the end.”80
71. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136; id. at 143-44 (Brady, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 136 (majority opinion).
73. On the day of the larceny, a police officer questioned J.D.B. and a friend
who a police officer saw looking into the windows of a house. Brief for Petitioner
at 2, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121). Beyond
speaking with J.D.B.‟s guardian, his grandmother, nothing resulted from the
police officer‟s questioning that day. Id.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 3-4; In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136.
76. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136, 139.
77. Id. at 147 (Brady, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795, 803 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (Beasley, J.,
dissenting), aff‟d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). Some courts have held that statements made
by a school official to a student do not factor into to the custody determination
unless the official was acting as an “agent” for the police or under the direction
of police. See State v. V.C., 600 So. 2d 1280, 1281-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(assistant principal not acting as agent of police, so student not in custody); In re
T.A.G., 663 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that assistant
principal acted as an agent of the police when he interrogated student while
school resource officer was present, so student was in custody); People v.
Pankhurst, 848 N.E.2d 628, 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (finding no Miranda
violation because school officials were not acting as agents of the police); In re
K.D.L, 700 S.E.2d 766, 767, 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that juvenile
interrogated by school officials while school resource officer was present was in
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J.D.B. thereafter incriminated himself;81 he asked
DiCostanzo “whether he would still be in trouble if he gave
the items back.”82 DiCostanzo explained that while
returning the items would “be helpful,” the matter was
“going to court” anyway.83 DiCostanzo stressed this further
by telling J.D.B. that he was considering a secure custody
order, which he informed J.D.B. would mean placement in
juvenile detention.84 DiCostanzo told J.D.B. that a secure
custody order may be necessary because he was not certain
that J.D.B. would behave.85 Thus, J.D.B. needed to prove to
DiCostanzo that he would not cause more trouble, by being
cooperative and assisting the police—“help[ing] [him]self by
making it right.”86 Significantly, to thirteen-year-old J.D.B.,
being helpful or cooperative meant to “do what you told [sic]
and not give „em [sic] any problems.”87
After J.D.B. had incriminated himself, DiCostanzo told
J.D.B. for the first time that he did not have to talk and
that he could leave, but that he hoped J.D.B. would stay.88
custody because school officials were acting “in concert” with the police); J.D. v.
Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 721, 725 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no Miranda
violation where assistant principal was not a law enforcement officer or acting
as an agent of one).
81. See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 137.
82. Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id.
84. In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d at 803 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (“I specifically said, what‟s done is done, [J.D.B.], now you need to help
yourself by making it right. I told [J.D.B.] that with the information that I had
been given, that if I felt that he was going to go out and break into other people‟s
houses again because he really didn‟t care, then I would have to look at getting a
secure custody order. And he asked what that was. And I explained to him that
it‟s where you get sent to juvenile detention before court.” (quoting DiCostanzo‟s
testimony)).
86. Id.; see also id. at 804 (“The unmistakable implication is that, to prevent
Officer DiCostanzo from having the „feeling‟ that J.D.B. might engage in future
break-ins, J.D.B. would have to „help himself‟ by providing the police with more
information.”); see also Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 230
(2006) (“Juveniles may acquiesce more readily [than adults] to police
suggestions during questioning.”).
87. New Brief for the State at 9, In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009) (No.
190A09) (quoting J.D.B.‟s testimony).
88. In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d at 803-04 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
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J.D.B. then, “talking rapidly,”89 told DiCostanzo about the
items he took, answered DiCostanzo‟s questions, and signed
a statement.90 At the end of thirty to forty-five minutes of
questioning, and the end of the school day, Officer
DiCostanzo permitted J.D.B. to take the school bus home,
but told him that the police would meet him at his house
later, where they would speak to his grandmother and
aunt.91
The State filed two juvenile petitions against J.D.B.
shortly after the interrogation.92 The youth moved to
suppress his statements, claiming the admissions were a
product of custodial interrogation where he should have
been informed of his Miranda rights pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona93 and section 7B-2101(a) of the General Statutes of
North Carolina,94 a state statute95 that codifies and
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 73, at 5.
90. Id. at 5-6; In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 137.
91. In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d at 797-98. When J.D.B. returned home,
DiCostanzo and another officer were waiting. Id. at 798. J.D.B.‟s guardian was
not home and had not been contacted. Id.; see generally infra note 96 (discussing
the North Carolina statute requiring parents of juveniles under fourteen to be
present during an interrogation if any statements the juvenile makes are to be
admissible in court). J.D.B., who had already given police many incriminating
statements, followed DiCostanzo‟s advice that it would be “helpful” to give back
the stolen items. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 137. J.D.B. brought stolen jewelry
to the officers, showed them where he hid other items, and drove with police in
their patrol car to his friend/accomplice‟s home because he believed he could
convince his friend to give stolen items to the police. Id.; Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 73, at 7.
92. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136.
93. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 138.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT . § 7B-2101 (2007). The statute provides:
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and may be used
against the juvenile;
(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or
custodian present during questioning; and
(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that
one will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented
and wants representation.
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expands96 Miranda warnings for juveniles.97 The trial court,
adjudicating J.D.B. a juvenile delinquent, found that he was
not in custody while police interrogated him; the appellate
court affirmed.98 The lower courts of North Carolina and the
North Carolina Supreme Court all held that age was a
subjective factor not to be considered in the objective
custody determination.99 While the North Carolina Supreme
Court acknowledged, in a footnote, that the habeas corpus
standard of Yarborough v. Alvarado100 was not binding on

(b) When the juvenile is less than 14 years of age, no in-custody
admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted
into evidence unless the confession or admission was made in the
presence of the juvenile‟s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney. If an
attorney is not present, the parent, guardian, or custodian as well as
the juvenile must be advised of the juvenile‟s rights as set out in
subsection (a) of this section; however, a parent, guardian, or custodian
may not waive any right on behalf of the juvenile.
(c) If the juvenile indicates in any manner and at any stage of
questioning pursuant to this section that the juvenile does not wish to
be questioned further, the officer shall cease questioning.
(d) Before admitting into evidence any statement resulting from
custodial interrogation, the court shall find that the juvenile knowingly,
willingly, and understandingly waived the juvenile‟s rights.
96. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 138. It is important to note that section 7B2101 expands Miranda rights for juveniles. It shows the intent of the state
legislature to afford additional protection to juveniles in custody. The statute
has particular precautions for those who are under fourteen years of age,
requiring a parent present during any interrogation in order for an admission to
be used against the child in court; thus, the statute legislature recognized an
important difference between younger juveniles and those over the age of
fourteen. See § 7B-2101.
97. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 138; see § 7B-2101.
98. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d. at 136-37.
99. Id. at 140.
100. 541 U.S. 652, 663-64 (2004).
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the court,101 the court still held it persuasive,102 basing its
decision upon Alvarado‟s vague dicta.103
B. North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion: In re J.D.B.
The North Carolina Supreme Court based its custody
analysis on a North Carolina case with a nearly identical
premise as the United States Supreme Court‟s test in
Thompson v. Keohane.104 Examining the totality of the
circumstances in J.D.B.‟s interrogation, the court found the
following relevant to support a finding of no custody: (1)
J.D.B. agreed to questioning,105 (2) it appeared he
understood the questions,106 (3) the door to the interrogation
room was neither locked nor guarded,107 (4) the interview
lasted thirty to forty-five minutes,108 (5) J.D.B. was advised
later in the interrogation that he did not need to answer

101. See Alan Raphael, Does Miranda Allow a Court to Consider the Age of a
Juvenile When Determining Whether He Was in Custody During an
Interrogation?, 38 PREVIEW OF U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 232, 233 (2011) (“Because of
the procedural posture of [Yarborough v. Alvarado] and the standard of review
involved, it is not clear precedent for [J.D.B. v. North Carolina] . . . .”).
102. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 140 n.1.
103. See id. at 140. In holding that age was not a factor to be considered in the
Miranda custody determination, the court cites Alvarado, immediately before
setting forth its rule, to state that it “adheres” to the rationale that age would
“creat[e] a subjective inquiry.” Id.
104. See id. at 138 (“[A]n appellate court must examine all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a
formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v.
Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (N.C. 2001)). In North Carolina, the custody
analysis “requires application of an objective test as to whether a reasonable
person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or
that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). For the custody analysis in Thompson, see
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-16 (1995).
105. See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 139.
106. See id. at 137 (noting that J.D.B.‟s answers to the questions were
“appropriately responsive,” showing he understood the questions asked).
107. Id. at 142-43.
108. Id. at 137.
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questions, was not under arrest, and could leave,109 and (6)
J.D.B. was allowed to go home on the bus at the end of the
school day.110
The court did not find significant that: (1) J.D.B.‟s
guardian was not contacted,111 (2) J.D.B. was in a closed
room,112 (3) a uniformed officer escorted J.D.B. from his
classroom,113 (4) J.D.B. knew that the police would be
waiting for him when he returned home,114 and (5) J.D.B.
was not informed that he did not have to speak or that he
could leave until after he had incriminated himself.115 The
court found these factors were not “sufficient „indicia of
formal arrest‟”116 to prove that J.D.B. “had been formally
arrested or had had his freedom of movement restrained to
the degree associated with a formal arrest.”117 This is so
despite many courts‟ determinations that these factors—
such as confronting the subject of the interrogation with
evidence of his guilt, the subject not coming to the
interrogation voluntarily, and not affirming that the subject
could refuse questioning have been upheld as strong
indicators of custody.118
Most troubling about the North Carolina Supreme
Court majority‟s finding is that it has increased the
threshold necessary for a finding of custody when a child is
interrogated in a school in North Carolina.119 The court

109. Id. As will be discussed shortly, J.D.B. did not receive these warnings
until he had already made incriminating statements. See infra note 115 and
accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 136-37.
112. Id. at 136. The court did not mention whether J.D.B. was aware the door
was unlocked.
113. Id. at 143 (Brady, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 137 (majority opinion).
115. Id. at 137.
116. Id. at 139.
117. Id. (quoting In re W.R., 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (N.C. 2009)).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
119. See Clay Turner, Simple Justice: In re J.D.B. and Custodial
Interrogations, 89 N.C. L. REV. 685, 705-06 (“[T]he majority introduces here a

2012]

JUVENILE INTERROGATIONS

577

emphasized that for juvenile students in the school setting,
the restriction on freedom of movement must “go[ ] well
beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school
environment in general” that apply to all students because a
“school[‟s] environment inherently deprives students of
some freedom of action.”120 The court does not provide
examples of restrictions beyond those “characteristic” in a
school setting.121 In In re K.D.L., decided a year after In re
J.D.B., the North Carolina Court of Appeals sheds some
light on what the North Carolina Supreme Court might
have considered an inappropriate restriction of a student‟s
freedom of movement.122 The court in K.D.L. proposed that a
student “being frisked and transported in a police cruiser”
would not be “one of the usual restraints” faced by all
students in general and would be beyond the general
restraints of the school environment.123
Here, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court does
not provide support for what it is implying: that the police
questioning of a student in a closed room regarding a nonschool related criminal act may be part of the typical school
setting.124 The court presents a new rule, but moves on
without elaborating on the necessary benchmark that would
reach beyond the typical limitations a child expects in
school.125 As both dissenting Justice Hudson126 and the amici
curiae for the United States Supreme Court case point out,
requiring restraints beyond the “typical” restrictions
applicable to all students while in school is not a workable
whole new tenet to the in-custody test—a minimum bar for finding a suspect in
custody at school.”).
120. Id. at 705 (quoting In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 138).
121. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. In re K.D.L., 700 S.E.2d 766, 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
123. Id.; see also In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249, 262-63 (D.C. 2005). The court in In re
I.J. held that a youth was in custody when he was questioned in a private office
at the youth center where, by court order, he lived and attended school, since his
situation lay somewhere between a private home and prison environment and
was “likely more coercive than that of a school.” Id. However, what the court
found determinative was that police did not say anything or take any actions to
“mitigate the compulsive atmosphere.” Id. at 263.
124. See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 139.
125. Id. at 138; see supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
126. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 146-47 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
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test; it would be “virtually impossible” to find custody in
schools under this threshold.127
Even without considering age, the North Carolina
Supreme Court incorrectly weighed a traditional objective
custody consideration, freedom to leave. The court
concluded that because J.D.B. was permitted to take the
school bus home following the interview, this tips the scale
toward no custody.128 The court compared J.D.B.‟s situation
to Oregon v. Mathiason—where the United States Supreme
Court held the adult suspect was not in custody because he
“came voluntarily to the police station” and left “without
hindrance”129—by stating that J.D.B., too, left his
interrogation “without hindrance.”130 However, the J.D.B.
majority ignored the fact that J.D.B., unlike the suspect in
Mathiason, did not come to his interrogation voluntarily;
J.D.B. was taken out of his class by a uniformed officer,
without being told why police wanted to speak to him, and
escorted to the interrogation room.131 If J.D.B. had come on
his own volition, he would have been permitted to walk to
the interrogation room unescorted.132 Further, had J.D.B.
not gone with the officer, he would have likely faced
disciplinary action from the school.133 Furthermore, focusing
on what an individual did after the interrogation to
determine if an individual was in custody during the
interrogation is, “as a matter of logic[,] unsound.”134 Riding
the bus home was not leaving “without hindrance” because
127. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, et al., supra note 3, at 17.
128. See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 137, 139-40.
129. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
130. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 139 (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
131. Id. at 136; id. at 143-44 (Brady, J., dissenting); id. at 147 (Hudson, J.,
dissenting).
132. See id. at 143-144. (Brady, J., dissenting) (“The only logical reason for
Officer Gurley to escort J.D.B. was to restrain his freedom of movement . . . .”).
133. See id. at 143 (“The Student Handbook at Smith Middle School . . .
instructs students to „[f]ollow directions of all teachers/adults the first time they
are given,‟ „[s]top moving when an adult addresses‟ them, and „[w]alk away only
after the adult has dismissed‟ them.”).
134. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 340 (3d ed. 2000). The
authors do note, however, that despite the “unsound logic” the court has
nonetheless considered whether a suspect was allowed to leave after the
interview as a factor in the custody determination. Id.
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J.D.B. was informed that the police would meet him at
home.135 Knowing this, J.D.B. likely faced the realization
that he “literally [could not] escape” questioning and the
continued involvement of law enforcement.136
The police employed a version of “deliberate two-step”137
questioning strategies in withholding from J.D.B. the fact
that he could decline questioning until after he incriminated
himself.138 Even if, on remand, the North Carolina state
court does not find the interrogation to be custodial, it
should apply the rationale that it and many states have:
“question first, warn later” interrogation techniques may be
improper when determining Miranda cases.139 Because
J.D.B. was not told he could leave or decline questioning
before he incriminated himself, the “fruit”140 obtained after
135. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 137, 139 (majority decision).
136. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984). In Murphy, the United
States Supreme Court held that the compulsion felt by a suspect to continue an
interrogation because of a fear that terminating it would lead to a revocation of
probation, when such suspect was not physically restrained and could have left,
is not comparable to the pressure exerted on a “suspect who is painfully aware
that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Id. at 433-34.
Though J.D.B., like Murphy, was not physically restrained, the pressure he, as a
juvenile, likely felt is more akin to someone who “literally cannot escape”
interrogation.
137. See Mark Hamblett, Circuit Clarifies Law on „Two-step‟ Confession
Tactics, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 2007, at 1.
138. In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795, 803 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (Beasley, J.,
dissenting), aff‟d, 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
139. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004) (“Because the questionfirst tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda‟s purpose of reducing the
risk that a coerced confession would be admitted, and because the facts here do
not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have served
their purpose, [the] statements are inadmissible.”); United States v. Williams,
435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] trial court must suppress postwarning
confessions obtained during a deliberate two-step interrogation where the
midstream Miranda warning—in light of the objective facts and circumstances
—did not effectively apprise the suspect of his rights.”).
140. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (holding that
narcotics discovered by “illegal actions of the police” were “fruit of the poisonous
tree”); see also In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d at 805 (Beasley, J., dissenting) (citing
Wong Sun for the proposition that J.D.B.‟s statements were custodial and the
information obtained from them should be suppressed.). Though the “fruits” test
typically applies in the Fourth Amendment context, the rationale here is the
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he was informed of his rights should be suppressed as
“tainted.”141
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION: J.D.B. V.
NORTH CAROLINA
A. Majority Opinion: Children Are Not “Miniature Adults”
The United States Supreme Court majority held age is
an objective factor that may be considered in the Miranda
custody determination when the age is known or
“objectively apparent” to the officer at the time of the
interrogation.142 Justice Sonia Sotomayor—joined by
Justices Kennedy, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan—wrote a
forceful and matter-of-fact majority opinion, plainly stating
that states can no longer ignore the “common sense”
knowledge that children are not adults and cannot be
treated as adults in police interrogations.143
After a recitation of the facts, the Miranda progeny, and
the objectivity requirements that the caselaw has required
for custodial interrogation, the majority discusses the
“reality” that age is an objective circumstance that warrants
consideration in determining custody.144 Sotomayor cites to
several of the Court‟s earlier decisions acknowledging the
difference between children and adults and how children
“understand the world around them.”145 Noting several legal
restrictions already placed on children, the majority
confirms the divergence between adults and children in the

same, as J.D.B. made his initial incriminating statement without knowing he
did not need to answer the detective‟s questions or even stay in the office.
141. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604, 607 (“[A] midstream recitation of warnings after
interrogation and unwarned confession could not effectively comply with
Miranda‟s constitutional requirement, [thus,] a statement repeated after a
warning in such circumstances is inadmissible.”).
142. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011).
143. Id. at 2398, 2407.
144. Id. at 2399-2406.
145. Id. at 2403.
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law,146 mirroring the petitioner‟s and his amici‟s arguments
in their briefs.147
Further distinguishing age from other “personal
characteristics,” the majority expresses that, unlike other
qualities such as nationality or I.Q., youth is a
characteristic that applies “universal[ly]” across the broad
class of minors.148 Sotomayor emphasizes that age is a “selfevident” characteristic that does not require a searching
analysis or any special training for judges or law
enforcement.149 The majority demonstrates this by noting
that age has been successfully considered as an objective
circumstance in other areas of the law.150 Sotomayor cites to
tort law to show that age is considered to be a “relevant
circumstance” in negligence cases due to children‟s differing
community experience.151
While there was discussion at oral argument regarding
psychological and empirical data readily available to prove
the cognitive differences between an average adult and a
child in comprehending an interrogation,152 the majority
chooses to focus instead on human experience and
knowledge of “what any person knows . . . about children
generally”—that children and adults are distinguishable in
many, significant ways.153 The majority criticized applying
the Miranda custody rule in a way that would create an
artificial standard for children by holding them to the same

146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 73, at 19-22; Brief of Juvenile
Law Center, et al., supra note 3, at 8-13.
148. See id. at 2403-04 (“Like this Court‟s own generalizations, the legal
disqualifications placed on children as a class . . . exhibit the settled
understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal.”).
149. See id. at 2403 (stating that age generates conclusions that apply to
children as a class and are “self-evident”).
150. Id. at 2404.
151. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 10 cmt. b (2005)).
152. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 0911121). Justice Scalia was skeptical that empirical data was necessary to
determine that “the older a child is to an adult [sic], the more adult-like they
are. The younger, the farther away they are from that adult standard . . . .” Id.
153. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403.
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standard and ability to comprehend an interrogation as a
reasonable adult.154
The custody analysis requires judges to consider any
objective circumstances that may be relevant155 in
determining whether “a reasonable person [would] have felt
he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave.”156 Thus, the majority‟s main rationale is that
childhood “is different” because one can easily conclude that
“children are most susceptible to influence.”157 This
conclusion, Sotomayor insists, is objective because it does
not require the fact finder to consider the specific child‟s
mindset, but rather how interrogations may impact children
as a class.158
The majority attempts to dispel the respondent‟s
arguments that the Court must consider J.D.B.—and
youths in general—as if he were an adult in the same
situation. The majority engages in an effective, tongue-incheek analysis in which it asks the reader to consider the
custody inquiry from the viewpoint of an adult being taken
from a seventh grade classroom by a uniformed officer and
being interrogated behind closed doors, surrounded by a
police officer, his principal, and other adults.159 The majority
quickly points out that this satirical image would be an
“absurdity.”160 The majority opinion thereafter sets forth a
new factor for Miranda: “so long as the child‟s age was
known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or
would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable
officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent
with the objective nature of that test.”161 As a practical
necessity, the majority points out that the age of the youth

154. Id. at 2405.
155. See id. at 2407 (“Not once have we excluded from the custody analysis a
circumstance that we determined was relevant and objective, simply to make
the fault line between custodial and noncustodial „brighter.‟”).
156. Id. at 2402 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
157. Id. at 2404-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2405.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2406.
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questioned will not be determinative or significant in all
cases.162
Responding to the dissent‟s attacks on the objectivity
and practicality of such a test, the majority asserts that this
new test does not overrule the standard that the
interrogating officer‟s subjective “unarticulated, internal
thoughts” are not objective considerations in the custody
determination.163 The majority—in a footnote—attempts to
address concern of an overruling of this established
standard by emphasizing that the consideration of age is a
simple task because it only need be taken into account when
the child‟s age is known or objectively apparent to the
interrogating police officer.164 Thus, because it is not a
subjective analysis, looking into the mindset of the officer is
not needed.165
Along with the irrelevance of the interrogating officer‟s
“internal
thoughts,”166
the
majority
asserts
that
consideration of age also does not require searching through
the youth‟s “actual mindset,”167 but into considerations
which would impact how the reasonable person would
perceive whether or not he was free to terminate the
interrogation and leave.168 The majority broadly claims that
consideration of all objective circumstances in an
interrogation requires an inquiry into how the subject of the
interrogation would “internalize and perceive” the
circumstances of the interrogation and thus, are relevant
considerations.169 The majority does not provide an
illustration, so the reader has to consider whether other
recognized objective circumstances—such as a locked door,
handcuffs, not being told he is free to leave—would truly

162. Id.
163. Id. at 2406 n.8.
164. Id.
165. See id. The Court explains that “an officer‟s purely internal thoughts have
no conceivable effect on how a reasonable person in the suspect‟s position would
understand his freedom of action.” Id.
166. Id.
167. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402.
168. Id. at 2407.
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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require looking into how the individual “internalize[s] and
perceive[s] the circumstances of an interrogation.”170
With disdain, the majority attacks a “fundamental flaw”
in the dissent‟s reasoning.171 Sotomayor stresses that clarity
for law enforcement is not Miranda‟s only purpose and,
diverging from earlier opinions,172 argues that clarity is not
the Court‟s primary concern when balancing the interest in
ease and even-handedness in application with assuring that
the subject of the interrogation is adequately protected.173
The majority concludes by dispelling the suggestion that
the voluntariness test, which permits consideration of age
and any relevant qualities of the individual in determining
whether a waiver was voluntary, would provide sufficient
protection to juveniles.174 Such a test, the majority
concludes, is not sufficient, alone, to protect the rights of
juveniles from compulsion.175 Pointing out that Miranda was
created because the voluntariness test was inadequate at
protecting against compulsion, the majority notes that
relying on it alone to take age into account would give
juveniles fewer rights than those afforded to adults through
Miranda.176
The majority seemingly does not want to admit that
there may be some difficulty in applying its new test, so it
defends it through what amounts to a policy argument—
essentially, children must be considered as different.
Ultimately, in attempting to articulate this new, breakout
rule, the majority spends more time rebutting the dissent
than providing guidance to the courts below—which is the
ultimate weakness in an otherwise well-reasoned opinion
and a hot target for the dissent.
170. Id. at 2406.
171. Id. at 2407.
172. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668-69 (“[T]he custody
inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the
police . . . .”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984) (recognizing the
significance of an easily applied rule for law enforcement, who have a short
amount of time to make the custody inquiry).
173. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2407.
174. Id. at 2408.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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Dissenting Opinion: Derailing Miranda

In an exacting dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Justices
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas,177 claims the majority‟s
holding “run[s] Miranda off the rails”178 by injecting the
“highly fact-intensive”179 consideration of age into the
objective Miranda test. Accusing the majority of
unjustifiably expanding Miranda, the dissent finds that age
is a subjective factor, not to be considered in the totality of
the circumstances of an interrogation.180 The dissent admits
that Miranda, being both over- and under-inclusive, comes
with high costs that often require law enforcement and the
courts to ignore circumstances that may have impact on
whether the individual would have felt free to leave.181
These costs also include suppression of “„trustworthy and
highly probative‟ statements that may be perfectly
„voluntary under [a] traditional Fifth Amendment
analysis.‟”182 Acknowledging that many defendants differ
from the hypothetical reasonable person, the dissent notes
that this does not justify carving out exceptions for those
personal characteristics.183 The dissent argues that first, any
of Miranda‟s costs are outweighed by the need for a clear,
straightforward custody analysis and second, that there are
other
safeguards
available
for
more
vulnerable
defendants—the voluntariness test.184
The dissent argues that not only is consideration of age
in the custody analysis an erosion of Miranda, but an
unnecessary one, as the voluntariness test is a sufficient
safeguard that considers the suspect‟s age and other
177. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 2418 (stating that the “constitutional rule against coercion”
should be applied and that “[t]here is no need to run Miranda off the rails”).
179. Id. at 2409.
180. See id. at 2414-15 (stating that the Court will have to abstractly declare
that age is different from other characteristics like maturity, education, and
intelligence, in order to avoid further undermining Miranda‟s rationale).
181. Id. at 2408-10 (discussing relevant, but not considered factors, such as
experience with law enforcement and particular sensitivity to police
questioning).
182. Id. at 2411 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)).
183. Id. at 2409.
184. Id.
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individual characteristics.185 The majority‟s consideration of
age is deemed unnecessary for other reasons: first, many
juveniles who are interrogated are near the age of
majority;186 second, youth may already know their Miranda
rights due to prior experience with law enforcement187
and/or Miranda‟s pervasiveness in popular culture;188 third,
the majority‟s concerns mainly surround students
interrogated in schools, where courts can provide a higher
standard for the such interrogations without altering the
custody analysis;189 and fourth, state courts may always
intervene to provide additional safeguards for children
when the people deem it necessary.190
One of the less parsed out parts of the majority
opinion—the lack of a bright line, or any line, to distinguish
age from other individual qualities—is what the dissent has
its easiest time preying upon.191 While the dissent notes that
age could arguably impact how the individual perceives an
interrogation, it cannot find a rationale for distinguishing
why one‟s intelligence, education, cultural background, or
experience with law enforcement would be distinguishable
from age.192 Though the majority hangs its hat upon the fact
that the State conceded, in oral argument, that blindness
would be an objective circumstance that could be considered
as part of a totality of the circumstances analysis,193 the
dissent argues that blindness is distinguishable from age.194
The dissent notes that age requires the inquirer to look into
“internal circumstances” of the individual questioned, which

185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2418 & n.13.
189. Id. at 2409; see also Brief of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121).
190. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2413-15.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2406 & n.9 (majority opinion). The State also conceded that
paraplegia and deafness would be similar objective circumstances. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 28, 41.
194. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2417 n.10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the Court‟s precedent has held to be inappropriate.195 While
the majority claimed that considering whether one‟s age
would impact an individual‟s perception of an interrogation
is a “common sense” analysis, the dissent notes that there
are times when an officer cannot easily distinguish the age
of a minor or where a minor lies about his age.196
The dissent cautions against inquiring into the
subjective views of the police officer, which, it argues, is
what the majority‟s holding requires.197 The dissent foresees
courts facing a flood of litigation over whether the officer‟s
perception of the suspect‟s age was reasonable.198 A
guideline to examine this reasonableness does not exist
because the majority does not provide a way to guide judges
in determining when age will be relevant.199 Though the
majority states that any person knows that “a 7-year-old is
not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult,”200 it does not
provide for any rationale for whether age is still relevant for
a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old or why an eighteen-year-old
would be any less susceptible to interrogation than a
juvenile.201
Predicting a future of overcautious police officers,
frustrated courts, and inconsistency between the states, the
dissent foresees a “bit by bit” breakdown of the clarity of the
one-size-fits-all Miranda test.202 Implicitly, then, the dissent
laments that such procedure will mean fewer valid
confessions and more guilty subjects evading punishment.203
195. See id. at 2411 (“The totality of these circumstances—the external
circumstances, that is, of the interrogation itself—is what has mattered in this
Court‟s cases.”).
196. Id. at 2415.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2416.
200. Id. (quoting majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2418.
203. Justice Alito explains that “[i]n its present form, Miranda‟s prophylactic
regime already imposes high costs by requiring suppression of confessions that
are often highly probative and voluntary by any traditional standard.” Id. at
2412-13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Alito thus suggests that a less clear
rule will impose even higher costs.
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The dissent predicts an ominous choice that will need to be
made in the future: either restrict Miranda‟s consideration
of other “personal” characteristics to one‟s age—which the
dissent perceives as artificial line drawing204—or expand
Miranda to include other traits, after which it would
become unworkable.205
C. Analysis: Age Does Not Obscure Clarity
While the United States Supreme Court may not have
provided much guidance on implementing the objective
inquiry of age, North Carolina and the states can find
guidance in courts of sister states who, even before the
J.D.B. decision, demonstrated the ability to consider age in
the Miranda analysis as just one part of the totality of the
circumstances, without allowing the fact that the suspect
was a juvenile to be determinative or carry more weight
than other circumstances.206 The following pre-J.D.B.
decisions similarly demonstrate the consideration of age
without disastrous consequences.
1. Pre-J.D.B. Decisions Considering Age in the Custody
Determination.
a. Nebraska. The Nebraska Supreme Court found
differently from North Carolina when considering the
objective circumstances of a juvenile‟s interrogation in
connection with a sexual assault on his sister.207 In re
Interest of C.H. presented a similar fact pattern to J.D.B.,
leading to a finding that the juvenile was in custody.208 In
that case, the child was also escorted to a school conference
room.209 As in J.D.B., the door to the interrogation room was
closed, but not locked, and the child was not handcuffed. 210
Before the child, C.H., was questioned, he was not told he
was not under arrest, that he did not have to speak to the

204. Id. at 2409.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., In re Interest of Tyler F., 755 N.W.2d 360, 372-74 (Neb. 2008).
207. In re Interest of C.H., 763 N.W.2d 708, 714-15 (Neb. 2009).
208. Id. at 712, 715.
209. Id. at 712.
210. Id. at 712, 715.
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officers, or that he could leave.211 Though the child‟s father
consented to the interrogation, he apparently did so out of
the child‟s presence.212 The Nebraska court followed
Thompson in determining the restraint on the juvenile‟s
freedom of movement, considering all of the objective
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.213 Similar to
J.D.B., there was no evidence that the child resisted
speaking to the officers.214 The interview lasted for thirty
minutes—approximately as long as J.D.B.‟s interrogation.215
The officer performing the interrogation was dressed in
plain clothes, as was DiCostanzo.216 Like DiCostanzo, the
officers confronted C.H. with incriminating evidence.217
Though the child was physically unrestrained during the
interview, Nebraska‟s high court found it most relevant that
C.H., much like J.D.B., confessed without “the assurance
and knowledge that he was free to terminate the interview
and leave.”218
While the court in In re C.H. did not discuss age in its
custody inquiry explicitly, it was considered as an objective
factor in their determination.219 For instance, the court
refers to a reasonable person standard, but in the same
paragraph, mentions that the juvenile, C.H., was a
211. Id.
212. Id. at 711.
213. Id. at 713-14 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 (1995));
see also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
214. In re C.H., 763 N.W.2d at 715; In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 137 (N.C.
2009), rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
215. In re C.H., 763 N.W.2d at 712; In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 137.
216. In re C.H., 763 N.W.2d at 715; In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 144 (Brady, J.,
dissenting).
217. See In re C.H., 763 N.W.2d at 712. (“Drummond [the investigating officer]
described the conversation [with C.H.] as follows: „I told [C.H.] that his sister . . .
had spoken to her dad that morning and said that . . . there had been some
inappropriate sexual contact and that [she] had gone to the hospital where we
had been most of the morning and up until the time that we came and talked to
him. That [she] had been interviewed and also had been—and checked
physically.‟”); In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136 (“The investigator questioned
[J.D.B.] further and confronted him with the fact that the camera had been
found.”).
218. In re C.H., 763 N.W.2d at 715.
219. Id. at 716.
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fourteen-year-old high school student.220 What the court
found dispositive was that C.H. was not told he was not
under arrest or that he was free to leave.221 Thus, at the prewarning portion of J.D.B‟s interview when J.D.B. made
incriminating statements, J.D.B. was under the same level
of restriction and of the same mind-set as C.H. Under very
similar circumstances, and using the same United States
Supreme Court precedent, the Nebraska high court found
C.H. was in custody.222
Similarly, in In re Interest of Tyler F., the Nebraska
Supreme Court demonstrated the objective consideration of
age in a fact pattern similar to J.D.B.223 The court stated
that even if it considered the juvenile‟s age as part of the
custody analysis, it would not reach a finding of custody.224
In its view, the youth‟s age did not lead to a finding of
custody because he was told he was not under arrest, was
not handcuffed, the door to the interrogation room was
unlocked, “strong-arm” questioning tactics were not used,
and the youth returned to his classroom following the
interrogation.225 Additionally, the youth‟s parent gave
permission to the officers to speak to the youth.226
b. Wisconsin. A Wisconsin court found that a juvenile
was in custody when he was questioned by law enforcement
in a conference room in his high school regarding claims of
criminal sexual child abuse.227 While the juvenile‟s mother
consented to the interrogation,228 the juvenile did not have a
220. Id. (“C.H. was a 14-year-old high school freshman summoned to the
principal‟s office and questioned by an officer from the sheriff‟s department
regarding serious allegations of sexual assault. He was not told that he was free
to leave, and we conclude that someone in C.H.‟s position would not believe he
was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” (emphasis added)).
221. Id. at 712, 715.
222. Id. at 715.
223. 755 N.W.2d 360 (Neb. 2008).
224. Id. at 372 (“When compared to interrogations in case law from other
jurisdictions, Tyler‟s interrogation would not be custodial even if we took his age
into account.”).
225. Id. at 368-69.
226. Id. at 364.
227. Husband v. Turner, No. 07-CV-391-bbc, 2008 WL 2002737, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. May 6, 2008).
228. Id.
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parent present.229 The juvenile was escorted to the
interrogation, was kept in a room alone with police officers,
was not told he could leave or decline to answer questions,
and was not read his Miranda rights.230
The juvenile originally denied the conduct, but admitted
involvement after the officer told him she did not intend to
bring him to jail that day.231 Though the child was aware he
was going to return home, rather than to jail, at the end of
his school day, the court held he was in custody because a
reasonable person in the juvenile‟s position would not feel
he could terminate the interview and leave.232 The court,
using a rationale that seems to predict the words of the
United State Supreme Court‟s J.D.B. majority, found that
consideration of the juvenile‟s age is a necessary step in
determining the restriction on one‟s freedom of movement
under the reasonable person standard:
A reasonable person in plaintiff‟s situation would be a student who
was escorted by school personnel from class to a room near the
school offices, left alone in the room with interrogating police
officers and never informed that he was free to leave and not
answer questions. That reasonable person would not feel that he
233
was “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”

Though the court admits that considering age in the
custody analysis would be “inappropriate in many
interrogation situations,”234 consideration of the plaintiff‟s
status as a high-school-age student was found necessary in
this case.235
c. New Mexico. The New Mexico Supreme Court in State
v. Javier M. did not find the juvenile, who was questioned
229. Id.
230. Id. at *3.
231. Id. at *1.
232. Id. at *2-*3.
233. Id. at *3 (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
112 (1995)).
234. Id. at *3.
235. Id.; see also In re Welfare of G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 657 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (deciding custody determination of juvenile under a reasonable person
standard, but also discussing that suspect was a 12-year-old seventh grader who
had never been sent to the principal‟s office nor had had contact with law
enforcement).
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by police in an open stairwell in a friend‟s home with his
peers present, to be in custody for purposes of Miranda
warnings and a New Mexico state statute236 codifying and
expanding Miranda protections for juveniles.237 However,
the state‟s high court held that though the questioning was
only a brief, non-custodial “investigatory detention,” thus
not falling under Miranda, the child would still be granted
the additional protections in the statute.238 Here, the police
knew that the youth was under eighteen.239 While the court
found the child was not in custody when questioned, it held
that the legislature intended to extend protections to
juveniles questioned during non-custodial situations when
the child is suspected or alleged to have committed an act of
juvenile delinquency.240 The court explained that the rights
would only be given to a child who is suspected or alleged to
be a juvenile delinquent and that the child only need be
informed of his right to remain silent, rather than be read
the full Miranda rights.241
2. The Impact and Implementation of J.D.B. v. North
Carolina. The “shape”242 of Miranda will certainly change as
a result of J.D.B. The extent of this change is hotly debated,
with some commentators predicting that J.D.B. will lead to
the “end of Miranda itself.”243 While the full impact of J.D.B.
has yet to be seen, as the case is still relatively recent, the
initial impact will fall upon law enforcement.244 Police
departments will have to provide additional training to
236. N.M. STAT . A NN. § 32A-2-14 (2010).
237. 33 P.3d 1, 5-6, 10-11 (N.M. 2001). While this case was decided preAlvarado, the holding still stands as does the state statute.
238. Id. at 13 (“[W]e conclude that a child need not be subject to custodial
interrogation in order to be afforded the right to be advised of his or her
constitutional rights prior to police questioning.”); id. at 20.
239. See id. at 9. Police had separated the adult party guests from the minors
by the time police questioned Javier M. Id.
240. Id. at 13-14, 20.
241. Id. at 16, 18.
242. Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: The Future of Miranda, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 23, 2011, 2:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=116539.
243. The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 172,
246-47 (2011).
244. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Children‟s Age and Miranda,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://scotusblog.com/?p=122090.
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their officers for performing juvenile interrogations. The
difficulty is that the training is likely to be put into place
almost immediately, while the cases interpreting and
clarifying Miranda will trickle in far more slowly. Thus, at
least at the outset, the police officers may be over-inclusive
when interrogating juveniles, erring on the side of
caution.245 Notably, however, many police departments may
have a juvenile unit with officers specifically trained to
work with juveniles, as was DiCostanzo.246 Thus, while all
officers will require training, police departments can focus
their efforts on those officers most likely to come into
contact with juveniles.
While the J.D.B. majority may not provide “a word of
actual guidance”247 in the implementation of age into the
custody analysis, the impact may not be as much of an
impediment as the dissent dramatically predicts. As
discussed, state courts that have considered age in the
custody determination prior to J.D.B. have been able to
complete the analysis without finding age to be
overwhelming or determinative in all cases.248 As the
dissent itself points out, most juveniles interrogated are
“teenagers nearing the age of majority.”249 Thus, in many
cases, the age factor will be less relevant and not
determinative of whether the juvenile was in custody. The
J.D.B. case does not place as high a burden on law
enforcement as the dissent propounds; it requires that the
officer only consider age when he either knows the child‟s
age or when the age is objectively apparent to the
reasonable officer.250
While the dissent portends situations where a child
presents a false ID or where a child looks mature for his
age, those would not be situations that would be found to be
“objectively apparent.”251 It would require an inquiry into
245. Id.
246. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 9.
247. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2416 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
248. See supra Part III.C.1.
249. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2417.
250. Id. at 2404 (majority opinion).
251. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the surrounding circumstances—did the child present
falsified identification? The majority of these concerns can
be quelled by having the officer ask the child his age. If the
child lies and tells the officer an age of majority, the officer
cannot be held to have known the child was underage if the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation would not
have led a reasonable officer to conclude otherwise.252 In
close situations—for instance, where a 17-year-old tells the
officer he is eighteen, the officer should not be held
responsible for a good faith mistake.253 Yet, where a twelveyear-old claims he is eighteen, the surrounding
circumstances can be analyzed and there, it likely would be
held that the child‟s age would be objectively apparent.254
That inquiry would be guided by the majority‟s “common
sense” analysis that a seven-year-old is neither a thirteenyear-old nor an adult.255 While there may arise situations
like those anticipated by the dissent, the majority‟s
threshold does not appear to fault an officer who made a
good faith mistake, based on the surrounding
circumstances.256
3. Post J.D.B. v. North Carolina Decisions. J.D.B. has
been analyzed in a few state court cases relevant to the area
of custodial interrogation.257 Significantly, J.D.B. is most
cited in these cases for the holding that, though age is a
proper consideration, it is not always dispositive. The Iowa
252. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 20.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2407.
256. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 20.
257. While still more cases have cited to J.D.B., they do so as a mere citation,
in order to note that age is an objective inquiry or that age may or may not be
determinative. See, e.g., Kalmakoff v. State, 257 P.3d 108, 122 & n.62 (Alaska
2011) (citing to J.D.B. for the point that a child‟s age is a proper consideration in
the Miranda custody analysis); In re Louis D., 934 N.Y.S.2d 648, 653 (Fam. Ct.
2011) (“Courts recognize that juveniles are not miniature adults.”); D.V. v.
State, 265 P.3d 803, 807-09 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (citing to J.D.B. to hold that
because a fourteen-year-old may not have the same level of understanding as an
adult, the child could not be said to have understood a court order that he was to
remain in foster placement and that if he violated the order he could be held in
contempt of court). However, few cases actually use J.D.B. to perform a custody
analysis. Thus, the cases that merely cite to J.D.B. or use J.D.B. in noncustodial interrogation situations will not be discussed here.
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Supreme Court referred to J.D.B. when analyzing whether
an interrogation by a minor‟s social worker, wherein the
minor incriminated himself, was a custodial interrogation.258
The Iowa court thereafter found that the youth‟s age was
not relevant to the custody analysis as he was “just seven
months shy of his eighteenth birthday . . . .”259 Though the
J.D.B. case did not provide for consideration of other
personal characteristics, the Iowa Supreme Court also noted
the child‟s long history with law enforcement in its custody
analysis.260 Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court cited
J.D.B. when considering whether a minor was in custody
when questioned by law enforcement prior to being read her
Miranda rights.261 While the court noted the child‟s young
age was known to the officer, the court found that the
child‟s age was not dispositive due to the other
circumstances
surrounding
the
pre-Mirandized
interrogation.262
The dissent‟s prediction of the difficulty of “a 60-yearold judge attempting to make a custody determination
through the eyes of a hypothetical, average 15-year-old”263
has proven to be a feasible task not requiring great
“imaginative powers,” “knowledge of developmental
psychology,” or “training in cognitive science.”264 While these
early cases have not presented the challenges that may
arise in the future, they may indicate that the majority was
correct with its common sense mantra—that age in the
custody analysis can be considered with the same amount of

258. State v. Pearson, 804 N.W.2d 260, 268-69, 271 (Iowa 2011). The minor
was earlier in police custody, was Mirandized, and refused to speak, requesting
an attorney. Id. at 262. The child was later questioned by his regular social
worker in his bedroom at his youth home. Id. at 268.
259. Id. at 269.
260. Id.
261. In re Frances G., 30 A.3d 630, 632, 634-35 (R.I. 2011).
262. Id. at 634-35.
263. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2416 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
264. Id. (quoting majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. A PROPOSAL: PARENT OR GUARDIAN PRESENCE AT ALL
POLICE INTERROGATIONS
A. Introduction
While the United States Supreme Court determined
that age is a relevant factor to consider in the totality of the
circumstances, it remanded the case back to the North
Carolina state court to determine whether J.D.B. was in
custody.266 Though North Carolina‟s current statute, section
7B-2101, affords juveniles heightened protections in police
interrogations, these safeguards are reserved for custodial
interrogations of children under age fourteen.267 As such
restrictions would not provide sufficient protection in all
interrogation settings, additional safeguards are needed to
supply juveniles with protections during interrogations—
regardless of whether the questioning is deemed custodial
under a Miranda analysis.268

265. One author suggests that the dissent‟s concern with the ease of
application of the consideration of age is misguided, as such a situation would be
rare:
We would have to face a situation where the outcome of the case did in
fact turn on the officer making the “correct” decision about whether to
give a Miranda warning. This could only occur in a case where a police
officer gave a Miranda warning when he wasn‟t obligated to do so; the
officer would have chosen not to give the warnings if the interrogation
test were easier to apply; and the fact that he did give the warning
when he wasn‟t obligated to do so actually affected the outcome of the
case.
Christopher Jackson, Commentary, J.D.B. v. North Carolina and the
Reasonable Person, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9, 13 (2011),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/Jackson.pdf.
266. The case is pending on the Orange County juvenile court docket.
Telephone Interview with Barbara S. Blackman, Defense Attorney for Petitioner
(Nov. 3, 2011).
267. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2007).
268. The Miranda analysis is, under the totality of the circumstances, whether
the suspect is under arrest or the formal equivalent of arrest. See supra Part I;
see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Notably, because the United States Supreme Court
opinion chose not to discuss the permissibility of North
Carolina‟s heightened standard of interrogations in schools,
this portion of the North Carolina Supreme Court decision
remains good law in North Carolina.269 If such a heightened
requirement is permitted to stand, there may be a risk that
law enforcement will purposely choose to question a minor
at school in order to take advantage of the greater
restrictions on freedom of movement that would need to be
shown as a precursor to a finding of custody.270
Though the United States Supreme Court has now
added the consideration of age to the Miranda analysis, its
decision falls short of providing additional protection to
students interrogated in North Carolina schools. Even
where a North Carolina court will consider age, North
Carolina‟s current requirement of additional restriction on
freedom of movement beyond those customary in a school
environment will still apply.271 Thus, it is even more
imperative that North Carolina implements a safeguard
against false and impermissible confessions from its youth.
Miranda opponents and those who would join with the
J.D.B. dissent cite to a hindrance of law enforcement as the
paramount reason for their criticism.272 Proponents of such
arguments
insist
that
providing
non-custodial
interrogations with additional safeguards will inhibit
confessions,273 “cause police officers to second-guess the legal
future of a case,”274 and otherwise prevent law enforcement

269. See Turner, supra note 119, at 686.
270. Id. at 708.
271. The North Carolina Supreme Court requires that restrictions on a
student‟s freedom be “well beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the
school environment in general.” In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 138 (N.C. 2009),
rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
272. The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 243, at 24849 (discussing how J.D.B. destroys the paramount benefit of Miranda—a
straightforward custody test).
273. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda‟s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 394 (1996).
274. Allison Retka, Miranda Ruling: Not Just for Kids? North Carolina
Defense Attorneys Hope to Apply it to Teens Tried as Adults, N.C. LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Jun. 17, 2011.
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from convicting the proper wrongdoer.275 Whether there is
truth to this argument for adult convictions is a separate
question;276 however, the rationale of this argument for
minors is moot. Miranda itself held that the potential for
lost confessions and convictions is a smaller price for society
to pay than for a person to be deprived of his constitutional
rights.277
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this rightsbased view in J.D.B. v. North Carolina by holding that the
respondent‟s dogged focus on clarity and simplification of
the custody analysis was a “fundamental flaw,” as clarity
must take a backseat to proper protections from coercion. 278
The juvenile justice system is, or should be, one of
rehabilitative and restorative justice, not of retribution.279
With this universal goal in mind, and with the recognition
by scholars, empirical research, and the United States
Supreme Court that youth are less capable than adults in
comprehending and managing coercion,280 affording a

275. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 134, at 308-09 (discussing that although
statistics are “inconclusive,” some have argued that confessions are essential in
securing convictions).
276. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: A
REBUTTAL TO MISCONCEIVED OBJECTIONS 3 (1987) (“[A] civilized, decent society
need not be embarrassed by police interrogations and confessions. [Thus,] the
thinking that underlies much of the support for cases like Miranda must be
rejected, for these cases reflect a premise that police interrogation is a suspect
institution.”).
277. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-81 (1966) (“Although
confessions may play an important role in some convictions, the cases before us
present graphic examples of the overstatement of the „need‟ for confessions.”).
Empirical studies show Miranda has been applied with limited conviction loss
or difficulty to law enforcement. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda‟s Practical
Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 500, 501-03 (1996).
278. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2407 (2011).
279. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
280. For a recognition of juveniles as different in psychosocial and brain
development, see Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating
Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 418-19 (2008)
(“[E]mpirical studies have shown that adolescents are particularly vulnerable to
the classic interrogative techniques of confronting the suspect with false
evidence and utilizing other forms of „trickery.‟”), and Patrick M. McMullen,
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juvenile his right against self-incrimination is of greater
importance than the societal cost of a possible lost
confession. While there may be a reduction in confessions
after
implementation
of
this
parental
presence
requirement,281 this factor improperly equates the goals of
the adult criminal justice system with that of the juvenile
court.282 Moreover, this argument ignores currently existing
public policy in many states for affording additional
protections to juveniles not given to adults.283
New Mexico‟s approach in Javier M.284 of heightened
protections for juveniles should serve as a general model for
state legislatures in the approach they should take in
affording proper protections to juveniles. While New

Comment, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception
in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 992 (2005) (“[M]ost
psychologists [have] attribut[ed] age-based variance to either cognitive or
psychosocial deficiencies.”).
281. There may arise instances where the parent will be too protective of the
child, to the detriment of law enforcement, such as “interfering with or
sabotaging candid communication” between the juvenile, law enforcement, or
even a juvenile‟s attorney “in the name of „protecting‟ the child.” See Tamar R.
Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 1447, 1503 (2009) (citing Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the
Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custody Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1307 (2004)). Such circumstances can be cautioned against
by law enforcement setting standards, such as allowing the parent to consult
with the child before the interrogation, but not allowing the parent/guardian to
speak on the child‟s behalf during the interrogation until the officer gives the
parent/guardian permission to do so. Such a limitation on a wily parent would
still give the juvenile his protections of parental presence, but would allow law
enforcement to speak to the child if the child and parent consented to the
interrogation.
282. See Birckhead, supra note 281, at 1483-84 (“Children‟s limited knowledge
and understanding of the criminal justice system . . . underscores the
importance of creating a system that young offenders perceive as fair and
impartial. This goal is further supported by empirical evidence suggesting a
possible causal connection between procedural justice and lowered recidivism
rates for juveniles.”); Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, 31 CRIME &
JUST. 543, 544 (2004) (“Restorative practices have been inserted in different
degrees into most systems of responding to crime, especially youth crime.”).
283. See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d. 135, 140 (N.C. 2009) (Brady, J., dissenting),
rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
284. State v. Javier M., 33 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2001).
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Mexico‟s standard asks more out of law enforcement,285 it
provides needed procedural safeguards for youth. Though
the New Mexico approach is a good starting point, in that it
extends a warning requirement to traditionally noncustodial questioning, it is still too limited. While the
standard requires informing a juvenile being interrogated of
his right to remain silent and refuse questioning,286 it does
not require the presence of a parent or guardian for younger
juveniles, which puts those children at a greater risk of
feeling confused or coerced substantially more than they
would if they had a parent or guardian‟s advisement.
B. Proposal
To provide a workable, effective method for protecting
rights of juveniles, North Carolina and other states must
adopt a standard providing for mandatory parental
presence, or valid waiver of such presence, in police
interrogation of juveniles—regardless of whether the
questioning is traditionally considered custodial.287 When a
police officer or law enforcement agent wishes to interrogate
285. See Maria E. Touchet, Note, Investigatory Detention of Juveniles in New
Mexico: Providing Greater Protection Than Miranda Rights for Children in the
Area of Police Questioning—State of New Mexico v. Javier M., 32 N.M. L. REV.
393, 405 (2002) (“A test of whether a child was subject to an investigatory
detention requires a subjective inquiry into the mind of law enforcement officers
and may prove difficult to analyze in less factually clear cases in the future.
Application of Javier‟s test would have provided objective proof of the officer‟s
subjective state of mind, „that is, whether he or she suspects that the Child was
delinquent.‟ Instead, the court applied a test with a strong subjective component
that may not prove easy in the practical application of law enforcement.”).
286. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (2010).
287. Authors analyzing juvenile interrogations have proposed different
solutions in order to grant additional protections to juveniles confronted with
interrogations. One such proposal would mandate counsel‟s presence at any
police interrogation—custodial and non-custodial. See Ellen Marrus, Can I Talk
Now: Why Miranda Does Not Offer Adolescents Adequate Protections, 79 TEMP.
L. REV. 515, 527-33 (2006). This proposal is unworkable because it would be far
too great of a burden on states. Such a proposal would essentially require the
state to provide an attorney any time law enforcement questions a juvenile.
Another proposal would require parental presence only at custodial
interrogations. Robert E. McGuire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile
Miranda Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogations, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1380-86 (2000). As this Note argues, presence at custodial
interrogations is not sufficient to protect juveniles‟ rights, such as J.D.B.‟s.
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a juvenile under the age of eighteen regarding his
knowledge or involvement in criminal or delinquent
conduct, a parent or legal guardian must be contacted and
present at questioning.
If the juvenile is sixteen or seventeen, the parent or
legal guardian may give consent for the police to interrogate
the juvenile without his or her presence. However, a parent
or guardian may only give such consent if the sixteen- or
seventeen-year-old juvenile is first (1) informed of the
police‟s desire to question him, (2) the child affirmatively
expresses that he does not wish to have his parent or
guardian present, and (3) is told that police will be
contacting his parents or guardians whether or not he
requests their attendance. A parent or guardian shall not be
permitted to waive his or her presence if the child is under
the age of sixteen nor may the juvenile under sixteen years
waive his parents‟ presence.
In addition, even where a juvenile does not wish his
parent or guardian to be present, the juvenile shall not be
able to waive his parent or guardian‟s presence if the parent
wishes to attend. If there arises a circumstance where an
interrogating officer does not contact the parent to
implement the parental requirement or waiver as needed, a
per se rule will apply to bar as tainted any incriminating
statements that may result from the questioning. This
suppression will be true of all interrogations of minors
without parent contact—both those over and those under
sixteen-years-of age.
North Carolina affords additional rights to juveniles
through section 7B-2101 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina by making inadmissible an in-custody confession of
a child under fourteen if the confession was made in the
absence of a parent, guardian, or attorney.288 However, there
are two limitations in section 7B-2101 that need to be
expanded in order to provide juveniles with adequate
protections. First, the current statute invalidates in-custody
confessions made outside the presence of a parent,
guardian, or attorney for children under fourteen, but does
not afford these same protections to children over the age of
fourteen.289 Second, North Carolina‟s current statute limits
288. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(b) (2007).
289. Id.
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the protections to custodial interrogations.290 Though the
Miranda custody analysis now requires a consideration of
the youth‟s age, as age may frequently be deemed nondeterminative, juveniles must be afforded the additional
protection of parental presence during all police
interrogations beyond investigatory detentions.
1. Implementing the Parental Presence Proposal. The
rationale for parental presence at juvenile interrogations by
law enforcement is twofold. First, this nation has
recognized, through both empirical research291 and common
law,292 that juveniles will often feel intimidated and coerced
during law enforcement interrogations in ways that an
adult may not293—especially when the child is informed he is
a suspect or is facing charges.294 Second, having a parent or
guardian present levels the playing field for minors. 295 An
adult would generally help to reduce the level of coercion
and would be, in many situations, better able to explain the
situation to the child and guard against any coercive
tactics.296

290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 4, at 52-59; see also supra note 3.
292. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99, 2408 (2011);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71, 578-79 (2005) (recognizing the
difference between children and adults by prohibiting the death penalty for
juveniles).
293. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (“Adult advice would
have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some
adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to
know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.”).
294. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles‟ Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents‟ and Adults‟ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 333, 357 (2003) (“Adolescents are more likely than young adults
to make choices that reflect a propensity to comply with authority figures . . .
when being interrogated by the police . . . .”).
295. See McGuire, supra note 287, at 1382 (“[S]tudies indicate that a child,
unaccompanied by an adult advisor or a parent, would not only have serious
trouble understanding the warnings as given, but might not be in a position to
indicate to police that he does have such trouble.”).
296. See id. While there may arise some cases where a parent is difficult to
reach or is unable to come to the location of interrogation at the time required,
states must work out practical alternatives. This may include an oral promise
by the parent or guardian to convene on an alternate date or, in extreme
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Distinguishing between those over sixteen and under
sixteen years of age is a necessary differentiation. In his
dissent, Justice Alito struggled to comprehend how to
differentiate between “the average 16-year-old, . . . 15-yearold, or 13-year-old, as the case may be.”297 The majority did
not provide a workable test for these “gradations” beyond
proposing use of one‟s common sense.298 A proposal that
incorporates the Court‟s acknowledgement that age will not
always be relevant, while providing a workable standard
that would satisfy the J.D.B. dissenters, will provide for a
greater ease of application of the consideration of age in the
Miranda custody analysis. Recognizing that parental
presence is a necessary safeguard for juveniles, and one
that is even more essential for younger children, this Note‟s
proposal importantly reflects the “reality” recognized by the
Court: that older children, close to the age of majority, may
not feel compelled in a law enforcement interrogation while
an elementary or middle school aged child may.299
There may be situations where a sixteen- or seventeenyear-old, or the relevant parent or guardian, challenges the
validity of the waiver of parental presence, claiming such
waiver was not voluntarily and knowingly given. In such a
situation, the state should present evidence to show that the
waiver was valid in the same way that they would argue for
the voluntariness test to show waiver of Miranda rights.300
Thus, wherever possible,301 the wisest standard practice for
police should be to require juvenile and parental waivers in
writing.302 Similarly, if a juvenile ever claims he was coerced
circumstances, an appointment of a guardian ad litem until the parent may
arrive. It appears unlikely such a dire situation would arise.
297. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2416 (Alito, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2407 (majority opinion).
299. See id. at 2399.
300. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966); see also Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82, 287 (1936) (stating that a confession is
admissible when it is given voluntarily).
301. Notably, there will be situations where parents choose to agree to their
child‟s choice for a waiver because they are unable to come to the interrogation
in person. In such situations, requiring the written waiver may not be possible
or practical.
302. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (“An express statement that the individual
is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by
a statement could constitute a waiver.”).
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into saying he did not want a parent present, the
voluntariness test could apply to inquire whether the
waiver was coerced or whether it was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.303
In addition, mandating parental presence for juveniles
under sixteen, while permitting a waiver for those aged
sixteen and older reflects the understanding that younger
children are in need of additional protections due to their
lesser life and community experience than some sixteenand seventeen-year-olds.304 Sixteen is a rational age for this
split because of the national recognition that sixteen-yearolds are capable of accepting greater responsibility than
those younger than sixteen. All fifty states and the District
of Columbia either prosecute children sixteen or older in
adult criminal court or allow for a transfer to criminal court
at that age.305 Further, there are other significant legal
distinctions between sixteen-year-olds and younger
children, including compulsory attendance laws, which do
not require children to remain in school past age sixteen,306
and minimum age for drivers‟ licenses or learners‟
permits.307

303. Id.
304. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 669 (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (“17
½-year-olds vary widely in their reactions to police questioning, and many can
be expected to behave as adults.”).
305. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE , J UVENILE J USTICE : J UVENILES
PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL COURT AND C ASE DISPOSITIONS 64-88 (1995), available
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95170.pdf. In New York, for example,
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds charged with a criminal act are automatically
tried as an adult. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(1) (McKinney 2009); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 180.75(3)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1)
(McKinney 2012). Similarly, in North Carolina and Connecticut, a juvenile is an
individual under the age of sixteen. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-120 (2011); N.C.
GEN. STAT . § 7B-1501(7) (2011).
306. See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (Supp. 2011); IND. CODE § 20-33-2-6
(2007); IOWA CODE § 299.1A (2008); KAN. STAT . A NN. § 72-1111 (2009); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 159.010 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1561(1) (Supp.
2010); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3205(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT . §
115C-378(a) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-20-01(1) (2003); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
29, § 450 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. §22.1-254 (2010).
307. Unrestricted drivers‟ licenses are issued to minors at various ages,
ranging from sixteen years to eighteen years of age. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §
8-236 (2001) (unrestricted licenses issued at sixteen years of age in Kansas);
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This proposal still requires a totality of the
circumstances analysis as set forth in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina. Thus, even with the implementation of this
proposal, when a court needs to make a determination as to
whether the juvenile was in custody for purposes of
receiving Miranda warnings—a question that is separate
from the proposal here, which does not ask if the child was
in custody—the court will need to consider youth in the
totality of the circumstances. If a seventeen-year-old youth
declines to have a parent present when interrogated by the
police, a court can still consider whether his age is
determinative in creating a custodial interrogation when
analyzing whether the youth should have been read
Miranda rights.
Parent or guardian presence at interrogations will not
act as a significant roadblock for police. Parental presence
does not equate to refusal to cooperate with law
enforcement nor lost confessions.308 As a child is more
subject to the pressures of an interrogation than an adult,
specifically in an in-school interrogation, a parent or
guardian will generally be more of a “match” for law
enforcement and will be better equipped to represent the
interests of the juvenile.309 In many cases parental presence
would likely provide security and a sense of comfort for the
juvenile in an unfamiliar situation, reducing unnecessary
coercion or tactics the investigator may otherwise try to use
on the juvenile alone.
Parent or guardian presence will not protect the child
from coercive interrogation nor lead to waiver of his rights
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-10 (West 2011) (unrestricted licenses granted at eighteen
years of age in New Jersey).
308. S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 796-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding child
was not in custody when questioned in his school by law enforcement and by his
parent); see also State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 680-82 (Iowa 2009) (finding
custody for juvenile when he was interrogated by law enforcement in the
presence of his father where he was not told he was free to leave); In re A.S., 999
A.2d 1136, 1146, 1149-50 (N.J. 2010) (holding a child‟s incriminating statements
must be suppressed where the child‟s mother was present during the
interrogation coerced and pressured her daughter to speak).
309. McGuire, supra note 287, at 1382 (“[S]tudies indicate that a child,
unaccompanied by an adult advisor or a parent, would not only have serious
trouble understanding the warnings as given, but might not be in a position to
indicate to police that he does have such trouble.”).
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in every case.310 Certainly there will be situations where a
parent or guardian will pressure the youth to cooperate
with law enforcement, leading the youth to confess or
incriminate
himself.311
Similarly,
there
will
be
circumstances where the parent may not understand the
interrogation and will not be able to sufficiently aid the
juvenile.312 Scenarios can be imagined where a parent or
guardian does not truly understand the consequences of an
incriminating statement—due to the parent‟s intelligence
level, disability, a language barrier, or other circumstance.
Even with such possibilities in mind, the average
reasonable adult would still be far better at understanding
the circumstances of the interrogation than the average
juvenile.313
While this Note‟s proposal does not require the giving of
formal Miranda warnings at non-custodial interrogations,
empirical research on comprehension of Miranda warnings
reveals that children, in general, are at a great
disadvantage in understanding interrogation situations
when compared to adults. Widely cited studies on juveniles‟
ability to comprehend Miranda warnings show that
juveniles are less capable than adults in understanding
police interrogations.314 For instance, in one study, when
juveniles were asked to explain the definition of Miranda
terms such as “consult” or “attorney,” 20.9% of juveniles, as
compared to 42.3% of adults, were able to show an
understanding of such terms and over 55% of juveniles,
compared to only 23.1% of adults, showed they did not
completely understand Miranda warnings.315 Though adults
may have some difficulty with comprehending Miranda
310. See Farber, supra note 281, at 1293-96 (noting that a conflict is likely to
arise where the parent is the victim of the juvenile‟s alleged offense or has a
connection with the victim of the alleged offense whereby the parent may
influence the judge, prosecutor, or other authority figure).
311. In re A.S., 999 A.2d at 1146; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
152, at 16.
312. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 656-58 (Mass. 1983).
313. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles‟ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1136-43, 1156-59 (1980).
314. Id. at 1156-59.
315. See Marrus, supra note 287, at 525-26 (discussing Grisso‟s research to
support her argument that juveniles need additional protections during
interrogations).
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warnings and custodial interrogations in general, it is
apparent that children comprehend the situation far less
than adults.316 While a parent may not fully understand a
police interrogation of his or her child,317 custodial or
otherwise, the parent will likely be in a substantially better
position to understand, leaving the child and his rights less
vulnerable than they would be without the parental
presence.318
Rather than mandate a per se rule that all police
interrogations of juveniles require Miranda warnings, the
more workable and objective proposal here would be for the
relevant police interrogations319 to occur in the presence of
the child‟s parent or guardian. It is important to note that
such parental presence would not be required for a mere
investigatory detention where police are asking basic,
background questions,320 but when the child is believed to
have knowledge relating to a criminal or delinquent act and
the questions relate to such knowledge or participation.
316. Id.
317. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 10 (noting that adults,
along with children, will sometimes have difficulty understanding Miranda
warnings).
318. See, e.g., Marrus, supra note 287, at 525-26 (explaining that, while some
adults fail to understand their Miranda rights, they generally understand them
much better than adolescents).
319. The proposal is only for interrogations, not questioning that could be
“routine booking questions,” which would not require parental presence under
this rule. See Touchet, supra note 285, at 405 (“A test of whether a child was
subject to an investigatory detention requires a subjective inquiry into the mind
of law enforcement officers and may prove difficult to analyze in less factually
clear cases in the future. Application of Javier‟s test would have provided
objective proof of the officer‟s subjective state of mind, „that is, whether he or she
suspects that the Child was delinquent.‟ Instead, the court applied a test with a
strong subjective component that may not prove easy in the practical
application of law enforcement.”).
320. Such questions would be considered “general questioning” as they would
only cover basic background information and would not seek to find out answers
to questions concerning the alleged crime at hand. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 477 (1966) (“General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding
a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not
affected by our holding.”); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601
(1990); United States v. Duarte, 160 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[There is an]
exception to the Miranda rule for questioning that is designed to obtain only
routine booking information.”).

608

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

This proposal is not unworkable. Several state statutes
and case law currently afford additional protections to
juveniles in the areas of interrogation and criminal
proceedings.321 The currently existing laws recognize the
need to provide youth with different and additional
protections, recognizing the difference between the two
groups. For example, New York‟s statute regarding
custodial interrogation of a juvenile allows for
considerations of a child‟s age in the determination of the
appropriateness of the length of questioning and the
necessity for parental presence.322 Further, under New
York‟s statute, the police are required to contact the child‟s
parent or guardian as soon as they have taken the child into
custody.323 West Virginia also takes an even stronger stance
in that it does not require a child to be in custody in order to
have statements made to law enforcement suppressed if
they were not made in the presence of his counsel or his
guardian.324 West Virginia‟s statute is significant in that it
does not require the statements to be made in an
interrogation setting.325 Some states currently require
parental presence when the child is subject to custodial
interrogation,326 while others mandate that the child‟s
parent at least be contacted before any interrogation or
questioning commences.327
2. Alternative Proposals. There exist many differing
proposals for providing additional protections to juveniles
interrogated by law enforcement regarding their
involvement in criminal or delinquent acts. Some authors
advocating for additional protections for youth have
proposed a per se rule requiring the presence of counsel

321. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, et al., supra note 3, at 25.
322. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 305.2(8) (McKinney 2012).
323. Id. § 305.2(3).
324. See W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2(l) (2009).
325. Id.
326. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2333
(Supp. 2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.059 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, §2-2-301
(2010).
327. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 627(a) (West 2008); FLA. STAT. § 985.101
(2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-32 (2006); IOWA CODE § 232.19 (2011); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-5-331 (2010).
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regardless of custody.328 Another has suggested mandatory
parental presence only when the youth is in custody.329 The
former suggestion is an unrealistic one. While it ensures the
juvenile would likely make the most informed decision, it
presumably requires the state to provide an attorney every
time an officer wishes to speak to a juvenile. Such a
requirement would likely be both costly and burdensome.
Requiring parental or guardian presence at a custodial
interrogation is an important requirement and one that is
encompassed within this Note‟s proposal; however,
requiring a parent only after it is determined that an
interrogation is custodial will not provide sufficient
protections to juveniles.330 There will undoubtedly arise
situations like the one present in J.D.B.‟s case, where the
officer does not believe the interrogation to be custodial, and
thus, a parent is not contacted. Under a standard requiring
parental presence only during custodial interrogation, the
only time a child could be guaranteed parental presence is if
he is placed in handcuffs or told he is under arrest. 331
Requiring parental presence at interrogation for all law
enforcement interrogations beyond the basic background
questions provides necessary protections to juveniles while
maintaining the prohibition against searching into the
officer‟s mind and rationale.332
A third proposal sets forth additions to expand section
7B-2101 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. This
proposal comes closest to providing youth with the
appropriate level of protection from law enforcement
coercion. The proposal would require that a juvenile:

328. See, e.g., Marrus, supra note 287, at 528-29 (discussing benefits of per se
rule).
329. See McGuire, supra note 287, at 1359 (explaining the proposed approach
requiring parental notification and presence for custodial interrogations of
juveniles).
330. See Cara A. Gardner, Failing to Serve and Protect: A Proposal for an
Amendment to a Juvenile‟s Right to a Parent, Guardian, or Custodian During a
Police Interrogation After State v. Oglesby, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1685, 1687-88 (2008)
(discussing the need for increased juvenile protections).
331. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (citing California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
332. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011).
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[S]hall be “in-custody” for the purpose of this section when, in
light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable juvenile of
the age and in the position of the juvenile would believe himself to
be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action
333
in some significant way.

This proposal would expand the United States Supreme
Court‟s holding in J.D.B. v. North Carolina by inquiring
into the specific age of the juvenile and mandating that age
be determinative, where as J.D.B. declines to look into
“gradations” of age and says age may or may not be
significant.334 This proposal‟s second prong would mandate
that any interrogation regarding off-school-grounds
criminal acts equate to custodial interrogation when the
minor is questioned by police in school.335 It requires that
when a juvenile is “questioned by police in school about a
crime having taken place outside of the school [the juvenile]
shall be „in-custody‟ . . . .”336 The latter proposal, requiring
that all interrogations occurring on school grounds
regarding any criminal conduct are deemed a custodial
interrogation, would lead to the breakdown of Miranda the
J.D.B. dissent feared. While such a standard would afford
far greater protections to youth, in light of the proposal‟s
first requirement, this school-specific per se rule is
superfluous. If the child were to be found in custody under a
totality of the circumstances Miranda analysis, he should
similarly be found in custody if the same circumstances
exist during an in-school interrogation. Thus, this proposal
is overreaching and erodes Miranda further than is
necessary to provide adequate protections to juveniles.
3. Facing Opposition. This Note‟s proposal will not
likely face implementation without some strong opposition
from some states. The states of Georgia, Louisiana, and
Pennsylvania are examples that opponents to this proposal
will be sure to have in their arsenal. These three states
have adopted alternatives to a strict totality of the
circumstances test in the analysis of custody for a juvenile,
but reverted back to a true totality of the circumstances test

333. Turner, supra note 119, at 712.
334. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406-07.
335. See id. at 2405 (discussing “the coercive effect of the schoolhouse setting”).
336. Turner, supra note 119, at 712.
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not long after.337 While the tests in these three states are
distinguishable from the proposal set forth in this Note,
analyzing the concerns these states held in overturning
their safeguards may mirror the kind of concerns states
may raise when presented with this proposal.
Georgia, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania enacted per se
approaches as alternatives to the totality of the
circumstances test, and soon after switched back.338 In
Georgia, the court adopted a rule that stated if a parent is
not separately advised of the juvenile‟s right to counsel,
incriminating statements that result from the juvenile are
excluded.339 The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved this
approach,340 less than ten years after its adoption, without
providing much rationale.341
Similarly, Louisiana‟s per se rule required that the
juvenile subject to a custodial interrogation have a
“meaningful” opportunity to speak with an interested
parent, guardian, attorney, or adult who has been fully
advised of the juvenile‟s rights before the juvenile waives
his right to remain silent.342 Louisiana reverted to the
totality of the circumstances test two decades later, citing to
the rigidity of the per se test, but showing a true concern
about losing valuable confessions.343
Finally, Pennsylvania‟s per se rule had a similar
foundation to Louisiana‟s approach. A juvenile‟s
incriminating statements were invalid unless the juvenile
had the opportunity to speak with an interested adult
before the custodial interrogation.344 Finding the per se rule
337. See Touchet, supra note 285, at 406.
338. Id.
339. Freeman v. Wilcox, 167 S.E.2d 163, 166-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
340. Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922, 926 (Ga. 1976) (“To the extent Freeman . . .
can be read to require an automatic exclusion, if the parent is not separately
advised, it is disapproved.”).
341. See David T. Huang, “Less Unequal Footing”: State Courts‟ Per Se Rules
for Juvenile Waivers During Interrogations and the Case for Their
Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437, 457 (2001).
342. State in the Interest of Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 594 (La. 1978), overruled by
State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998).
343. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d at 487-89.
344. Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 343 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. 1975), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Christmas, 465 A.2d 989 (Pa. 1983).
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too restrictive, Pennsylvania soon adopted a rebuttable
presumption test that the automatic invalidity of
incriminating statement made without the opportunity to
speak with an interested adult could be rebutted where the
prosecutor could show a knowing, intelligent, voluntary
waiver.345 However, the court rejected the presumption
standard a year later346 and reinstated a totality of the
circumstances test.347
The most substantial difference between the proposal at
hand and the per se protections overturned in Georgia,
Louisiana, and Pennsylvania is that this Note‟s approach
does not overcome the totality of the circumstances test. It
does not require that all interrogations of juveniles are per
se custodial or that all confessions or incriminating
statements are per se invalid. This proposal echoes the
common sense sentiment of the majority of J.D.B. v. North
Carolina in that it recognizes that a juvenile will not be as
well-equipped as an adult to understand interrogations and
protect his interests.348 Allowing for an additional layer of
protection and allowing for the totality of the circumstances
and the voluntariness tests to act as back up provides
juveniles with the level of protection necessary to protect
them from coercion and confusion. Furthermore, though
these three states determined their public policy to
surround a focus on confessions rather than additional
protections to juveniles, several other states have upheld
per se tests and other standards affording an additional
layer of protection on top of Miranda.349

345. Christmas, 465 A.2d at 992, overruled by Commonwealth v. Williams, 475
A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984).
346. Williams, 475 A.2d at 1288.
347. Id.
348. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011).
349. See Huang, supra note 341, at 449-56 (discussing the laws of the states of
California, Indiana, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Kansas and their per se
rules); see also Penelope Alysse Brobst, Note, The Court Giveth and the Court
Taketh Away: State v. Fernandez—Returning Louisiana‟s Children to an Adult
Standard, 60 LA. L. REV. 605, 614 & n.81 (2000) (citing to thirteen states that
have adopted per se approaches, twelve of which are currently still in effect,
with the exception of North Carolina‟s).
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CONCLUSION
J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old special education student
who was subject to interrogation by law enforcement
regarding his involvement in criminal conduct. 350 J.D.B. was
not told he could call his guardian.351 J.D.B. was not told he
was not under arrest.352 J.D.B. was not told that he was free
to leave the interrogation or decline to answer questions
until he had already incriminated himself.353 When the
juvenile attempted to share his perspective of the events,
his version of the facts was contradicted and he was
presented with evidence against him.354 When J.D.B. finally
admitted his involvement, police informed him that he may
be placed in juvenile detention.355 J.D.B. left the
interrogation only after law enforcement permitted him to
do so and with the knowledge that police would be meeting
him at his home.356
A thirteen-year-old in such a situation would feel that
he were under arrest and unable to terminate the
interrogation. Justice Alito, in his dissent in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, argued that allowing for consideration of J.D.B.‟s
age would turn the custody determination into a subjective
one;357 however, the pre-J.D.B. standard the dissent
supports is not a reasonable person standard, but a
reasonable adult standard. As the high Court has
recognized that adults and children have significant
physiological and cognitive differences,358 ignoring the
child‟s age in any interrogation could result in a great loss
of protection to juveniles.

350. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. 2009), rev‟d sub nom. J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
351. Id. at 144 (Brady, J., dissenting).
352. See id.
353. Id. at 137 (majority opinion).
354. Id. at 136.
355. See id. at 137.
356. Id.
357. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2411-12 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
358. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
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North Carolina must now recognize what the United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged—that a child
undergoing interrogation by law enforcement may feel that
he were under arrest or its equivalent, even where an adult
would not.359 In acknowledging this accepted differentiation,
North Carolina and other states should implement the
proposal this Note promotes to safeguard society‟s
vulnerable class. Significantly, had J.D.B.‟s guardian been
present during his interrogation, this case would likely not
be before the Court as his guardian would have likely better
protected his rights.360 To safeguard juveniles in
interrogations similar to J.D.B.‟s, state legislatures need to
afford their youth the additional procedural safeguards
necessary to protect them from self-incrimination by
mandating that their parent or guardian be present at all
police interrogations.

359. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403.
360. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 73, at 2. On the day of the larceny, law
enforcement spoke with J.D.B.‟s grandmother, his legal guardian, who
expressed hostility and resistance to the police officer; therefore, there is a
chance she would have prevented J.D.B. from speaking with police at all had
she been aware of the interrogation that was to occur. Id.

